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The massification of higher education in Ukraine is a fact while financing the system is 
still an issue. External pressures from the Central government and the market require changes in 
university governance. Europeanization of educational system and adherence to the principles 
laid down by the Bologna declaration add to already existing challenges faced by universities. 
This paper states that there is no one right prescription for changing governance in Ukraine’s 
universities, because they differ in their history, location, culture, organizational structure, 
student body, faculty, and educational process and content. It proposes different approaches to 
the different types of the universities, considering universities as collegiums and bureaucracies, 
and suggests the political system as a viable form of organizational structure for the task of 
reforming universities. 
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Introduction 
Ukraine, along with many other European countries, reforms its higher education in order 
to increase its effectiveness and efficiency and meet the changing demands of the market 
economy. The reform is based in part on the principles of the Bologna declaration. The process 
of reform faces many challenges, including defining the new role of the state in the education 
sector, establishment of the university autonomy, and further development of private education. 
The need for structural changes is obvious as the Bologna declaration and the Lisbon convention 
require development of a three-tier system of academic degrees, including bachelors, masters, 
and PhD, for successful integration into the European educational space. 
The massification of higher education in Ukraine is a fact while financing still an issue. 
Legacy of the Soviet educational system also poses some challenges. External pressures from the 
Central government and the market require changes in university governance. Europeanization of 
higher education and conformity with the unified Euro standards explain the presence of yet 
additional, international, external pressure. As demand on different specialties changes, state and 
private colleges and universities adopt curricula and change their offerings accordingly. 
University governance has to be reformed to be able to address the need for flexibility and 
responsiveness to the public demands, and at the same time comply with the state regulations and 
demands of the European educational community. 
This paper argues that there is no single correct prescription for changing governance in 
Ukraine’s colleges and universities, since they differ in their history, location, culture, 
organizational structure, student body, faculty, and educational process, and content. It proposes 
different approaches to the different types of universities, considering universities as collegiums 
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and bureaucracies, and suggests the political system as a viable form of organizational structure 
for reforming universities. 
 
Classification of higher education institutions in Ukraine 
The science and education sector that Ukraine inherited from the Soviet system is rather 
complex. First, there are around three hundred state higher education institutions (HEIs) in the 
country, not including community colleges, technical and vocational schools. Some of them have 
branches in other cities. In addition, there were around 150 private HEIs created since 1991. The 
function of teaching and learning stays with HEIs, while the research function traditionally 
belongs to Science & Research Institutes, or so-called NIIs. All the HEIs are under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Education and Science and other related Ministries while all the Science & 
Research Institutes were and still are under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences. Medical 
universities are under the authority of the Ministry of healthcare, all the military academies under 
the Ministry of Defense, and all the police academies are under the Ministry of the Interior. 
Other examples of such sector-related subordination of HEIs would be The Academy of the 
Diplomacy under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the University of Railway 
Transportation under the Ministry of Railway Transportation. Such system was typical for the 
centralized, planned Soviet economy. Essentially, different state ministries prepared specialists 
for their related sectors of the national economy in HIEs that they governed and funded. 
This paper offers a classification of HEIs in Ukraine based on such criteria as size of the 
institutions, scope of disciplines taught, and their functions. Three major groups of HEIs are 
identified, including universities, specialized HEIs, and private HEIs. Universities are large HEIs 
that host a wide variety of disciplines, including sciences, social sciences, and humanities, and 
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they are involved in fundamental research. Specialized HEIs include polytechnics, branch-related 
HEIs, and Military and Police academies. 
Universities, some of which were established before Soviet rule, can be characterized 
with some democracy, liberalism and freedoms, little anarchy, and a bit of corruption. 
Universities are located in large cities and supply specialists for industries, sciences, education, 
healthcare, and other industries as well as faculty for other HEIs. Universities are traditionally 
considered flagships of the education sector. 
Polytechnics are “technical twins” of universities that host a wide variety of technical 
specialties and do fundamental as well as some applied research. Polytechnics enroll large 
numbers of students, on par with universities, and are de facto universities for the technical 
world. Some, such as Kiev Polytechnic, Kharkov Polytechnic, Donetsk Polytechnic, and Lviv 
Polytechnic, are highly regarded. 
Branch-related HEIs are closely affiliated with certain branches of the national economy, 
including construction, nutrition, railways, auto, pharmacology, healthcare, industrial economics, 
etc. They are not as large as universities and their curriculum is certainly not as diverse. Some of 
the branch-related HEIs, such as pedagogical institutes and medical institutes, were established 
in each of Ukraine is twenty-four territorial units in order to satisfy the population’s demand for 
universal schooling and access to healthcare. 
Military academies and police academies serve different branches of military and law 
enforcement agencies. Some of the military academies are also organized based on branches 
within the military, such as corps of military engineers, military firefighters, airborne, 
paratroopers, and such. 
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Private HEIs, established after 1991 to fill market niches and meet excessive demand on 
certain majors, are all for profits and characterized by clear managerialism. Graduates of all the 
HEIs, including universities, polytechnics, and branch-related HEIs, are qualified specialists in a 
certain area, i.e. engineers, doctors, lawyers, math teachers, etc. Unlike in the US system, liberal 
arts colleges are non-existent in Ukraine, and so are professional schools within universities. 
Also, in distinction from the US education sector, in Ukraine only those educational institutions 
that offer five-year degrees and higher are considered HEIs. In order to satisfy industry’s demand 
on skilled labor, there are numerous two-year technical colleges, vocational schools, and 
community colleges in addition to HEIs. 
Finally, most of the research, including fundamental and applied sciences, is done within 
Research & Science Institutes. These divisions of the National Academy of Sciences do not run 
any educational programs except doctoral programs for their junior researchers. Many Research 
& Science Institutes are also branch-specific, as was typical for a planned economy. 
The Soviet system functioned well enough to supply qualified specialists for the national 
economy and to produce research of a high quality, mostly for the defense industry. Introduction 
of market forces in the education sector as a part of the market reform makes the system of state-
university relations even more complex. The system needs to become more effective and 
efficient, and this may be achieved through decentralization and reforms in university 
governance. After the reform of 1991, many HEIs were transformed into universities. Ukraine 
became a country with university system. This paper focuses primarily on the governance issues 
in two types of HEIs: universities and polytechnics. Even though prototypes of educational 
conglomerates emerge in certain districts that include branch-based HEIs, technical colleges, 
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lyceums, and even secondary and high schools, this process does not change the picture 
significantly. 
 
External pressure on university governance 
Recent research in Ukraine suggests that participation in higher education yields national 
economic gains, improves personal economic opportunities, and spreads social benefits. The rate 
of return on higher education degrees in Ukraine is high and supports sustainable economic 
growth in the country over the last eight years, despite political turmoil (Osipian, 2007). Despite 
the downfall in the economy in 1990s, the higher education sector grew steadily since 1991. In 
Soviet times, higher education was free, but access to some specialties was limited. Now half of 
the students attend for-tuition programs. Most of the for-tuition programs are hosted by state 
HEIs, while private HEIs enroll around twelve percent of all students. While this change seems 
to be an additional financial burden for students, it offers flexibility and is more appropriate for 
the market-based reform. 
The changing environment and external pressures initiate internal changes within the 
universities and create a need for a new balance between the organized anarchy of the 
universities and the external rationality inherent to university behaviour. New patterns of 
efficiency and effectiveness, based in part on the rebalancing of governing powers and the new 
structure of relations, have yet to come to pass. 
Since new rules of financing were imposed externally, any adaptation to these rules may 
be interpreted as a response for university governance. An adequate response may result in 
generous funding from both the state and the market, while an inadequate response forces the 
university to focus on financial survival and develop the curricula accordingly. The existing 
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system of higher education may be characterized as increasingly decentralized in terms of 
financing and at the same time it shows the least institutional autonomy, including in the area of 
finance. Only recently universities were allowed to accumulate funds on the bank account, yet 
US type endowments, invested in stocks and bonds or directly into other sectors of the economy, 
are still unheard of. Not surprisingly, the reforms that included cuts in governmental funding 
were not met with great enthusiasm by the academic community, especially at the beginning. 
Davies comments on the effects of similar financial cuts that took place in the UK: 
“Psychologically, such “cuts” were important in creating an atmosphere in institutions which 
was a confused combination of defensiveness, gloom, suspicion, realism and injured innocence.” 
(Davies, 1997, p. 129) In regard to the new policy of financing and control, Clark notes that “The 
UK is currently the outstanding case of maximization of distrust between government and 
universities; government sends out its agents – deputized academics – to observe teaching and 
research activities in thousands of departments, rates those activities numerically, and then funds 
accordingly. Departments soon learn defensive strategies of how to hide their weaknesses and 
exaggerate their strengths and turn this national exercise into a foolish game laced with cynicism 
and chicanery.” (Clark, 1995, p. 163) 
There are around forty state universities in Ukraine that were granted the status of 
national universities. These are the nation’s leading HEIs. Even though now all of the state HEIs 
receive governmental funding, in the future most of the state money may well be channeled to 
the leading, i.e. national, universities. State support will reflect governmental priorities in 
specific fields of knowledge and research, including the need for certain majors and specialists. 
Selectivity, in its turn, will raise the issue of funds allocation. 
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Another issue is the place of research in the higher education sector. All the Science & 
Research Institutes are under the auspices of the Ukraine’s National Academy of Sciences. The 
government in the Russian Federation is now considering the possibility of a gradual 
amalgamation of these research institutions with the leading state universities, while in Ukraine it 
is not even at the discussion stage. The Ministry of Education and Science can take over medical 
universities, as agreed with the Ministry of Healthcare, but is not ready to take under its control 
many other sector-related HEIs and research institutes. Moreover, the role of the Ministry itself 
has to be redefined. The process of decentralization and growing university autonomy may leave 
the Ministry with a lesser role than it played before, preserving such functions as coordination, 
forecasting, and quality control, but not as much funding and direct governance. Nevertheless, 
the Ministry of Education and Science claims the need to take over HEIs that are now under the 
auspices of other ministries, explaining the need for a unified system of coordination and control. 
The Minister of Education and Science Stanislav Nikolaenko voices the ambitious goal of 
placing all the state HEIs under one umbrella. 
External pressures are not limited to those posed by the state and by the market. The state 
creates challenges in terms of funding, regulations, and informal control. The market requires 
revenue diversification and matching the market demand that comes from both businesses or 
employers and households or consumers of educational services. There are other external 
challenges as well. Higher education in Ukraine faces a set of challenges, similar to those faced 
by many other European nations, including insufficient funding, changing curriculum, and 
structural changes. But in addition to the common problems, Ukraine’s higher education is 
riddled with corruption, including its most explicit forms, such as bribery, extortion, and fraud 
(Bondarchuk, 2007). State funding of universities on the one hand and demand of households for 
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“easy” degrees on the other hand, create opportunities for abuse. University faculty and 
administrators take the opportunity to supplement their formal incomes through illegal ways. 
Publicly funded places are for sale by the admission committees, and degrees are for sale for 
those seeking credentials, not knowledge. Corruption creates additional pressure on university 
governance. 
The President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko has asked state universities to curtail the 
corruption so endemic to admissions processes and called upon rectors and professors to put a 
stop to the bribery and cronyism that hold sway during entrance exams, a widespread practice 
that he characterized as “shameful and humiliating.” (MacWilliams, 2005, p. A20) Yushchenko 
pointed out corruption in education in his address to the students of Kiev National University in 
March 9, 2007: “We are talking about the way to eradicate corruption in higher education 
institutions, starting from the entry examinations; how to create an independent system of 
conducting competitive examinations; how to make it possible for the state funds that now 
extend to 54 percent of all students in higher education institutions, to support those specialists 
requested by the state who come through truly transparent and honest competition.” (Vystup, 
2006) 
In order to cope with corruption in admissions to publicly funded programs the 
government introduces standardized computer-based national test for high school graduates. The 
test is intended to replace subjective oral examinations run by admissions committees in state 
universities. Universities object to the test since it threatens their monopoly over the admissions 
decisions to state HEIs and, hence, to their discretionary power as a ground for generating 
informal benefits. 
 11
The Minister of Education and Science recognizes that some of the rectors refused to 
acknowledge the test and to run test-based admissions. Nikolaenko had to explain to these 
rectors that if they will not recognize the test and will not agree with the policies of test-based 
admissions, he will find others who will. What he meant by that is that those educational leaders 
who refuse to comply with the new state policies will be dismissed or removed from their 
offices. Such an attempt points to the strong governmental position on the issue and the need for 
strong state authority over the universities. At the same time Nikolaenko has to negotiate the test 
as well. Replacement of the rectors would not be an easy task. The Minister agrees that the tests 
will not replace the entry examinations completely. Some oral examinations will be preserved. 
This a priori leaves some space for corruption in college admissions. The new standardized test 
will also allow achieving implementation of internationally recognized practices in admissions to 
HEIs. 
Finally, the Bologna declaration, adopted by Ukraine, anticipates a complete 
restructuring of academic programs and the creation of a tree-tier system of educational degrees, 
including bachelors, masters, and PhDs instead of specialists, candidate sciences and doctor 
sciences. Such restructuring adds more bureaucratic burden on faculties and requires departments 
requires certain changes in university governance. 
The benefits of being prepared to make a commitment to the process of changing 
governance in response to external pressures for universities are unclear. To the extent that 
institutions adopt a form of governance that can readily engage with the pressures generated by 
their environment, they are then able to compete effectively in the political game for resources 
and power. Financial flows from the central budget to the universities have yet to be optimized in 
size and direction. The development of a new balance between teaching and research functions 
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leads to change in priorities in different HEIs. This trend, in its turn, may lead to deeper 
specialization between the research and teaching HEIs, or differentiation within the HEIs, or 
emergence of research institutions, or all of these possibilities together. The functions of 
university governance may change accordingly. 
 
Changing functions of university governance 
The definition of governance may vary depending on the field of research. Balderston 
defines governance as the following: “A general definition of governance refers to the 
distribution of authority and functions among the units within a larger entity, the modes of 
communication and control among them, and the conduct of relations between the entity and the 
surrounding environment.” (Balderston, 1995, p. 55) He says that in a contemporary US 
university the conventional building blocks for governance within the university are its trustees, 
the executive administration, the faculty, and other groupings and units, such as student 
government and alumni. Balderston presents the following list of functions that governance 
comprises: the safeguarding of institutional mission; the provision of a “buffer” between the 
internal world of the university and its external constituencies; oversight of the financial integrity 
and viability of the university; the enunciation of major policy standards and the initiation of 
actions of such magnitude that they could affect the viability of the institution; selection of the 
president and other key figures in the university hierarchy; the balancing of interests between the 
contending stakeholders of the university (Balderston, 1995, p. 55). Historical perspective may 
be important in analyzing possible future changes in university governance. 
Universities in Ukraine developed in few different ways because the country was not 
always within its modern borders and the nation itself was often under the influence of other 
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countries, including Poland, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Russian Empire. The creation 
of the university system in Ukraine is reflective of the process of nation-building. This explains 
why some of the universities tend to identify themselves with the Western European academic 
tradition while others lean more toward Russia. 
The university system in Ukraine under the rule of the Russian Empire has been 
developed under the scenario different from most European universities. From the very 
beginning the state was the initiator, promoter, financier, controller, and benefactor of the 
university system. Moreover, the state was the only institution to perform these functions. 
Therefore, the university system in Ukraine is traditionally centralized. The Ministry of 
Education in the Russian Empire was created in 1802, at the time when there were only two 
universities in the country: St. Petersburg University and Moscow University. Flynn describes 
creation of the university system in the Russian Empire under the auspices of the newly 
established Ministry of Education: “It soon was agreed, in 1802, to found a Ministry of 
Education whose governing body, called the Main School Administration, would direct all 
education throughout the empire through six universities, which were founded between 1802 and 
1804. Moscow State University, founded in 1755, was redesigned in 1804.” (Flynn, 1988, p. 3) 
The ministry subcommittee worked on drafting legislation and the statutes for universities. 
Kharkov University, the leading HEI in Eastern Ukraine, has developed successfully 
thanks to the centralized power and effort of the state-appointed curator: “Kharkov was not so 
badly off as Kazan, in great part because its curator S. O. Potocki, energetically pursued his task 
in recruiting faculty, insisted on the election of rector and council according to the statutes, and 
even found a way to borrow students from the church’s local college, when too few students 
enrolled to make feasible the opening of the university in 1805.” (Flynn, 1988, p. 10) Karazin, 
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regarded as a founder of the University, also contributed to its success. The centralized effort of 
the state bore its fruits. According to Flynn, “By the late 1830s, none of the universities had 
fewer than four hundred students while Moscow enrolled nearly nine hundred.” (Flynn, 1988, p. 
18) This state involvement in the process of the university building may be explained by two 
facts: first, the state was the only force capable of creating the university system at once rather 
than by letting it evolve gradually; and second, the state was interested to create a system where 
state control would be an immanent part of the existence of the universities. 
Flynn describes the position of the state authorities regarding control over universities: 
“Tsar Nicolas I meant clearly to answer the university question by blocking the university’s 
ability to promote change. He wanted the universities to serve the common good by supporting 
the autocratic Russia he had inherited from Peter the Great and his successors. This proved 
difficult, perhaps impossible, even in the short run. It was difficult even to find new rectors, 
unless the government was willing to pass over the men obviously best qualified for the posts. 
Thus, the rectors appointed were the same men previously elected.” (Flynn, 1988, p. 19) 
Development of universities in Western Ukraine was independent from the Russian 
Empire, but still dependent on the state. Lviv University, the leading HEI in Western Ukraine, 
was founded on January 20, 1661, when King John II Casimir of Poland issued the Diploma 
granting the Charter for the city’s Jesuit Collegium, founded earlier in 1608. From 1919 until 
September 1939, in the Polish Second Republic era, the university was known as John Casimir 
University in honor of its founder. Ukrainian professors were required to take a formal oath of 
allegiance to Poland; most of them refused and left the university in early 1920s. 
Another good example of the state’s involvement in academic life would be Kyiv Mohyla 
Academy, located in Kyiv, the capitol of Ukraine. The Academy was founded by the 
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Metropolitan of Kyiv Petro Mohyla in 1615, who adopted the organizational structure, the 
teaching methods, and the curriculum of the Jesuit schools. The Academy’s golden age came to 
an abrupt end with Hetman Mazepa’s defeat at Poltava in 1709. But after Russian Tsar Peter’s 
death, the school revived. Catherine the Second’s abolition of the Hetmanate in 1764 and 
secularization of the monasteries in 1786 deprived the Academy of its chief sources of financial 
support. The school became a ward of the Russian imperial government and its importance 
declined rapidly. In 1817 the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy was closed down and reopened only in 
1991, after Ukraine regained its independence (UKMA, 2007). 
The Soviet system of higher education inherited some of the essential features of its 
predecessor, the university system of the Russian Empire. Weak university self-governance was 
compensated for by strong state control. In Coleman’s words, “The Soviet Union has built up a 
single monolithic educational system under omnipresent party control with heavy inputs of 
political indoctrination at all levels.” (Coleman, 1965, p. 226) Despite the lack of autonomy, 
universities had a state approved model of self-governance, in which rectors were elected by 
faculty and staff to serve a certain term. 
Balderston emphasizes the importance of university autonomy: “Of all the tasks of 
university governance, the one that is fundamental is the assurance of effective autonomy. The 
ability to resist intrusion by political groups or fractional interests and the opportunity and 
obligation to keep the operation of the university self-directed are essential to the integrity of the 
institution.” (Balderston, 1995, p. 63) Other tasks include: the definition and implementation of 
the university’s mission and the approval of long-range plans; the achievement of unified support 
for major university commitments; the determination of institution-wide policy standards and the 
delegation of authority; the determination of procedures and standards for appointment, 
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advancement, and termination of key personnel; the approval of budgets and major financial 
components and the exercise of financial oversight; the provision of effective crisis management; 
and the integration of the mix of financial, academic, and institutional commitments (Balderston, 
1995, pp. 64-66). 
Safeguarding of the institutional mission in Ukraine may be unchallenged by the central 
government. The open market, however, may be a threat in the short run. A good example may 
be the numerous for-tuition programs in Ukraine and other former Soviet republics oriented on 
the production of diplomas, not qualified specialists. Missions of universities to research and to 
educate are undermined by the market demand for the degrees rather than for specific 
knowledge. 
Another threat to the university mission may be the prevalence of the entrepreneurial 
mission over the values of scholarship. Managerial decisions may become dominant in choosing 
the field and focus of teaching and research. Entrepreneurial culture, once settled within 
academia, may blossom and shade the primary mission of the university to produce and 
reproduce knowledge. University autonomy does not safeguard from such a scenario and in 
many instances may encourage it. 
The core of academia, traditionally composed of the humanities and sciences, may 
experience its downturn and under-financing based on the market demand and policy of the 
central government. The new role of university governance in Ukraine is to balance 
entrepreneurial and academic bases. The provision of a buffer between the university and the 
external environment in Ukraine may take either the form of a defensive action or cooperation. 
Cooperation will require entering negotiations and involvement in political actions. The state is 
unlikely to provide most of the funds and let the universities decide how they should be used. 
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The financial integrity of the university and its viability becomes a matter of primary 
concern in Ukraine. If cutting the central budgeting threatens the university overall, the financial 
independence of the departments threatens financial integrity of the university. Despite the 
general opposition of academics to the financial pressure, certain departments and faculties, 
usually led by strong individuals, have proven very adept at gaining for themselves considerable 
additional resources by entering the marketplace. This entrepreneurialism does not automatically 
undermine collegiality, but it sets up tensions in universities. 
In the Soviet system, the demand for specialists of different qualifications came from the 
state, since all enterprises were state enterprises. But there was also largely unsatisfied demand 
from the side of the population to study social sciences. With the beginning of the reforms, this 
pre-market demand of the population, supported by the necessary purchasing power, led to the 
emergence of many for-tuition programs and private for-profit colleges. New programs were 
created to match the excessive demand on such specialties, as economics, foreign languages, 
law, history, and journalism. Accordingly, faculties of economics, foreign languages, and 
jurisprudence were prospering, while traditionally strong faculties of mathematics, physics, 
chemistry, and other sciences were left to survive with diminishing state funding. Simply put, the 
new system was focused more on preparing specialists to manage new private enterprises rather 
than to design and launch missiles. 
The structure of university governance within HEIs is quite simple and includes rector, 
vice-rectors, deans, and chairs. Each university is comprised of faculties and each faculty 
consists of several departments. While the organizational structure is simple, the tasks for 
university administration become more diverse and more complex. Historically, some of the 
universities, established in the Russian Empire, including Kharkov University, had Board of 
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Trust, but in Soviet times they were abolished. The selection of the rector and other key 
administrators in the hierarchy becomes a crucial issue since centralized authority attempts to 
take a leading role in managing universities. The rector is now expected to represent the 
university in the academic arena, open market, and political negotiations with the central 
government and local authorities. The balancing of interests between the stakeholders leads to 
the balance of powers. Structural changes revitalize the political life of the universities and give 
an impulse to the changing balances of powers and shifting influence of interests of the different 
groups. 
Current changes in higher education in Ukraine require the governing bodies of the 
universities to initiate actions of such magnitude that they may affect the viability of the 
institutions. These changes can be seen as a threat to the university stability, financial soundness, 
and potential for growth, rather than to its very existence. Poor financial conditions of 
universities in the 1990s did not lead to frequent changes in university leadership. Evidence 
points to the fact that most of the university rectors, deans, and chairs of departments remain in 
their offices since the early 1990s. Such visible stability may be reflective of both growing 
university autonomy from the state and the state’s satisfaction with educational leaders elected 
and confirmed by the state almost two decades ago. Long-term appointments bear the risks 
associated with adverse selection. 
Market orientation will lead Ukrainian universities to acquire some business strategies. 
Economically successful universities will face the prospect of enlargement. The presence of the 
single governing board on the home campus will become insufficient, and power in the 
campuses-branches will be transferred to the managers reporting to the board. Delegation of 
authority will make some of these campuses-branches financially self-sufficient and 
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administratively independent. Balderston points out that “Large multicampus systems are so 
complicated that de facto delegation of many governance functions to the headquarters 
administration and thence to campus administrators becomes necessary. The governing board has 
limited purview over the details of finances, programs, and personnel selection. Governance then 
devolves for the most part on stakeholders other than the governing board, even though the board 
has final authority.” (Balderston, 1995, p. 70) 
Theoretically, in the future, the most successful branches may grow and become 
independent of their home institutions. In this case, the new governing board will replace the 
managerial structure. A good example may be multicampus public universities in the US, 
including the University of California. But this scenario in Ukraine is least likely, because 
faculty members visit branches for instruction and do not stay or relocate there permanently. 
There is also a quality issue, since the level of instruction in branches is thought to be lower than 
in the head institution. Local demand for higher education may decrease significantly, and 
branches will close, leaving more space for local HEIs. For instance, it is unlikely to expect the 
enlargement of Donetsk National University and monopolizing of the local educational market in 
Donbass, while smaller institutions disappear or merge. 
Another factor that impacts governing structures is the processes of globalization and 
internationalization. Internationalization of higher education leads to organizing university 
campuses in different areas, states, and countries. Rules and regulations in these conditions are 
different and often unclear. A single governing board is unable to cope with these realities. 
Organizing campuses abroad requires accounting for local specifics and addressing local 
demands. For Balderston, “Multicampus systems are susceptible to tampering on the part of local 
legislators and other politicians, to whom campus administrators and factions may appeal if they 
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are losers in internal power struggles. A governing board that fails to resist such tampering 
invites the disintegration of its system.” (Balderston, 1995, p. 7) 
At this point, Ukrainian HEIs do not extend their presence to foreign countries, and at the 
same time, the domestic market of educational services is monopolized by national providers. 
There are a few small branches of Russian universities that entered the academic territory of the 
country, but the faculty is predominantly from Ukraine. After the branch of Moscow State 
University (MGU) was opened in Sevastopol in 2001, there was a bilateral agreement set 
between Ukraine and the Russian Federation that allows for establishing branches of Ukrainian 
universities in Russia and branches of Russian universities in Ukraine. 
College mergers and acquisitions as a part of emerging university conglomerates or 
educational corporations do not take place in Ukraine. If such processes are to take place in the 
future, the collegial self-determining institution as the model of university governance will 
indicate serious short-comings. Managers of the branches will need formal and informal access 
to the academic community and ensure the diversity that is essential within a mass system of 
educational provision. Having the process of internal diversification within the enlargement and 
strengthening hierarchical structure of educational corporations, it may be of primary interest to 
observe and describe new emerging vertical and horizontal relations and vectors of power within 
university corporations. External relations among the faculties and colleges embodied in 
university corporations and their academic counterparts and independent and autonomous 
smaller colleges as factors shaping new managerial structures may also be of interest for the 
future research. 
Universities are open systems. The primary issue is not whether the administrative 
authority will become a new center of power or overpower the professional authority in the 
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universities. The issue is whether the university will be able to respond adequately to the new 
challenges of the external environment. The task here is to decide if the old collegiate-based or 
bureaucratic systems of governance will be able to accept the responsibility and act accordingly 
to address and solve the problems constantly generated by the changing external environment, or 
whether new powerful management will be necessary. As Partington (1994) points out, there are 
six areas that will continue to impact managers in higher education: the changing resource base 
allocation systems; more robust accountability at all levels; the encroachment of government; the 
influence of employers and other organizations; the impact of technological developments; and 
fluctuating policies on entry to higher education. 
Besides the external pressure from the government to become more financially 
independent and market-oriented and the market pressure to adjust the curriculum and 
organizational structure, there is a substantial internal pressure on universities as well. 
Surprisingly, this pressure comes from the same side that the external pressure does; salaries of 
academics are often non-competitive. Faculty members require salary increases. The question is: 
How much professional authority professors will be willing to sacrifice in lieu of the managerial 
authority to receive better material rewards? A good example here would be a doctor who wants 
to build his/her practice on medically interesting cases, but is guided by a manager who decides 
whom to render medical treatment. Here the money incentive dominates the incentive for 
research. In academia, research and instruction will become more demand driven and will fall 
under managerial decision-making. The market encourages decentralization and competitiveness, 
but it also creates monopolies. Higher education in Ukraine is pressed to become market-oriented 
by the centralized agency, i.e. the government, which monopolizes a number of regulatory 
functions. 
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The Bologna Declaration seeks to resolve the issues of mobility, transparency, 
employability, competitiveness, and attractiveness. International pressures, including recognition 
of the degrees, the growing population of international students in Ukraine, and international 
competition on the higher education market require changes. Neave (2003) points out that the 
relationship between super-ordinate community and national communities now present in the 
higher education systems of Euroland are in tension. While the Napoleonic model sought to 
protect the university from over-mighty external interests of the State, its Anglo-Saxon 
counterpart sought to protect academia from the State the better to allow the university to pursue 
its dealings with external interests (Neave, 2003, pp. 9-10). 
Ukraine has a strong tradition of educating students from abroad, mostly from the 
developing nations. The system of selecting and educating students from overseas was developed 
in Soviet times. It involved the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Science and 
Education, governments of foreign nations, their embassies, and ministries of education. Millions 
of foreign students from all continents were educated in the USSR. In Soviet times this system 
was considered a form of international aid that the Soviet Union delivered to developing nations 
in exchange for the loyalty of their political regimes. Eastern European students attended Soviet 
universities as well. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, students from North Korea and 
Cuba were replaced with students from China and Arab nations. Universities move on 
international arena to offer their educational services and generate revenues. Deans visit African 
and Asian countries that were long-time partners and discover new markets to market 
educational products. International reputation earned in Soviet times is now used with 
institutional initiative. The central government may be a good facilitator for the dialog between 
Ukrainian universities and international markets of higher education. Further internationalization 
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of higher education and its coordination within the European community will become an issue to 
be addressed within the next decade. 
The position of Ukrainian higher education on the international scene does not make 
clear how the system will work in the future; rather, it requires determination of the general 
trends and necessary steps to be undertaken by the government and the higher education 
institutions. Kerr’s formula points to the future: “For the first time, a really international world of 
learning, highly competitive, is emerging. If you want to get into that orbit, you have to do so on 
merit. You cannot rely on politics or anything else. You have to give a good deal of autonomy to 
institutions for them to be dynamic and to move fast in international competition. You have to 
develop entrepreneurial leadership to go along with institutional autonomy.” (Kerr, 1993, p. 330) 
Corruption, rampant in Ukrainian HEIs, undermines quality of education and its stance on the 
international market of educational services. Institutional autonomy and name recognition may 
be needed for universities to curb corruption and regain high recognition once earned by the 
Soviet educational system abroad. 
Neave also points out the assumption that institutions will prove more efficient if they are 
endowed with a greater degree of autonomy (Neave, 1995, p. 65). There are some success stories 
that are necessary to the promotion of reform. Successful universities would have to demonstrate 
a distinctive profile of leadership in reducing financial dependence on the national government, 
the capability of developing university-industry connections, the strengthening of a formal 
graduate school, and a steadily moving “up market” in attracting faculty, students, and academic 
standing among the universities of the world. The ways of changing university governance are 
different. Collegiums, bureaucracies, and political institutions have different organizational 
structures and perform these functions differently. 
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Collegiums, bureaucracies, and political institutions 
There is no single correct prescription for changing universities in Ukraine, because they 
are academically and geographically diverse. They differ in their history, location, culture, 
organizational structure, student body, faculty, and educational process and content. This paper 
proposes different approaches to the different types of universities, considering universities as 
collegiums, bureaucracies, or political systems. 
 
Collegial systems of classical universities 
The terms collegium and collegiality are often used in higher education. Bowen and 
Schuster suggest that collegiality has three major components: the right to participate in 
institutional affairs, membership in “a congenial and sympathetic company of scholars in which 
friendship, good conversation, and mutual aid can flourish,” and the equal worth of knowledge in 
various fields that precludes preferential treatment of faculty in different disciplines (Bowen and 
Schuster, 1986, p. 55). Sanders identified collegiality as “marked by a sense of mutual respect 
for the opinions of others, by agreement about the canons of good scholarship, and by a 
willingness to be judged by one’s peers.” (Sanders, 1990, p. 65) Organizational culture with its 
symbols, rituals, traditions, and spirit of academic fellowship plays a special role in collegial 
institutions. Many of the values, norms, and rules are unwritten but shared within the 
community. 
Equal worth of knowledge was characteristic of the Soviet university system and was 
expressed in equal pay for all instructors independently from their field or specialization. Despite 
the emphasis on sciences and mathematics, primarily for their use in the defense industry, social 
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sciences and humanities enjoyed equal recognition thanks to their role in advancing ideological 
base for the political regime. Such equality maintained the sense of collegiality in universities, 
even though humanities were overbalanced by sciences. In recent years faculties in social 
sciences generate much higher income while the role of defense-oriented sciences has declined. 
This new balance of powers undermines collegiality and leads to the atmosphere of suspicion 
and envy. At the level of university governance, the change was reflected in that rectors are now 
often selected from social scientists, unlike in the Soviet times, when representatives from 
mathematics and physics were given a priority. 
Birnbaum says that “Sustaining a sense of community that permits collegial organization 
requires shared sentiments and values on such matters as the general purposes of the 
organization, loyalty to the collectivity, and agreement about institutional character as reflected 
in the shared understanding of members, rather than necessarily by a written document” 
(Birnbaum, 1988, p. 90). According to Dearlove (2002), collegial forms of governance in higher 
education are on the retreat. He comments on opportunities for collegiality in university 
governance: 
Collegial governance seeks consensus through committees and so involves sluggish 
decision-making that is conservative and biased in favor of the status quo at the same 
time as it is inward looking and intensive to resource constraints and to external realities. 
It can be indifferent to institution-wide concerns, degenerating into the selfish pursuit of 
narrow departmental advantage based on ugly log-rolling coalitions of heads of 
departments. More than this, it is subversive of institutional leadership and is resentful of 
both lay and administrator involvement in the running of what are seen as ‘their’ 
universities. But such a perspective is increasingly being undermined from within, 
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because academics are choosing to withdraw from ‘administration’ in order to better 
advance their own careers through research that enables them to avoid a commitment to 
the good governance of any university. (Dearlove, 2002, p. 12) 
Halsley’s (1992) notion of ‘donnish dominion’ decrees that both within universities and 
colleges the governing bodies are the college fellows. Tapper and Salter (1992) say that 
sovereignty is not the same as power and that collegiality can be guided by strong individual 
leadership or wise committees or manipulated by self-serving cliques. The integral idea of 
collegiality is that nothing can be achieved unless it has the formal blessing of the collective 
membership. 
There are some assumptions built into collegiate government. To work effectively, dons 
should be interested in participation in the university, college affairs and decision-making. Also, 
they should be prepared to hold office if necessary. Governing scholars, if needed, may call for 
technical or professional advice. In this case, college affairs proceed slowly, involving both 
leadership and management, but dominated by the routines of committees and open to the 
delaying tactics. 
Relative closeness of faculty communities may seem contradictory to the characteristics 
of the university as an open system. Birnbaum suggests that “An important condition for the 
maintenance of a true collegial form is that it be comparatively small. Although some believe 
that the tradition of an academic community could be maintained only in institutions with no 
more than ten teachers and 150 students, these are probably unduly restrictive limits.” 
(Birnbaum, 1988, p. 91) In Ukraine, alumni rarely represent themselves as graduates of a certain 
college or university, but always by qualification, i.e. profession they belong to. This may be 
explained by the fact that in the Soviet times HEIs did not maintain much autonomy within the 
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centralized system, but were parts of the same system with all the degrees, credentials, and 
qualifications chartered and recognized by the state. The situation changes slowly as universities 
compete for recognition and ranking placement. Growing university autonomy brings to the fore 
sense of individuality, belonging, and trademark. At the same time, the sense of autonomy is 
diffused by the employment patterns; while in the Soviet times each faculty member held only 
one full-time position, now just about every college professor has two to three part time jobs in 
addition to his/her full-time appointment. Part-time jobs in such case are scattered around 
neighboring HEIs. 
Each faculty within a university, if had significant autonomy and self-control, may be an 
independent actor on the higher education market including planning and generating its revenue. 
Notable difficulties for undertaking any university-wide centralized action may be compensated 
by the coordination between the university government and the faculties. Increasing openness of 
the university to the market will lead to the growing need for accountability. 
Birnbaum points out that “As is true of other organizational forms, there is nothing 
innately effective or ineffective in the collegium. Cohesiveness and the development of powerful 
norms may reduce effectiveness if the norms emphasize the maintenance of interpersonal 
rewards. However, if norms emphasize commitment to task performance, then cohesiveness can 
be used to improve organizational performance.” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 94) Loose coupling in 
collegial systems has some positive and negative features. The positive features include 
thoroughness and different approaches in decision-making. The negative features of collegiums 
are difficulty in mobilizing the institution for the joint action, difficulty in coordination, and low 
accountability. In Ukraine, collegiums present obstacles for new hires, first of all because of the 
strong sense of community, belonging to the elite group. Leading universities do not like 
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strangers, people from outside. This impedes development of true competitive market for job 
candidates. Hiring decisions are a prerogative of chairs of departments, but new candidates have 
to be approved by the rector. Private colleges have less social cohesion since many instructors 
are temporary or part-time. 
In collegiums-type universities chairs of departments often have more authority than do 
deans, while in bureaucracies the balance of powers is reversed. Chairs are more respected as 
leading scholars while deans are considered as administrators. Bureaucracies have more clearly 
defined formal hierarchical structures. Accordingly, deans may have more authority than do 
chairs of departments. 
 
Bureaucratic systems of polytechnics 
Birnbaum, based on Blau (1956), considers bureaucracy as “the type of organization 
designed to accomplish large-scale administrative tasks by systematically coordinating the work 
of many individuals.” He says that bureaucratic structures are established to efficiently relate 
organizational programs to the achievement of specified goals. When behaviour is standardized, 
the activities and processes of organizations are made more predictable, so that the organization 
can become more efficient and effective (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 107). 
In bureaucratic systems deans, registrars, and financial officers fill specific roles, but the 
role and the person are not identical. Birnbaum notes that “People filling roles can be replaced by 
others (as long as they are technically competent) without having a noticeable impact on the 
functioning of the college.” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 111) The existing structure will need to be 
adjusted to the new external and changing governmental and growing market pressures. Also, 
some officers and administrators may be replaced by the more competent ones while the offices 
 29
will be preserved. The offices may be preserved by the replacement of the administrators or the 
old and irrelevant offices may be abolished and the new ones will be created. In any case, it will 
be an issue of the competence adequate to the new and changing realities. Effective and efficient 
functioning of the university depends on compliance with rules and regulations within the 
administrative hierarchy. Lack of flexibility in educational bureaucracies is partially 
compensated by the clearness of information flows, subordination, and accountability. 
Rules and regulations are created to deal with standard situations that occur on a regular 
basis. Perrow comments on rules saying that “They protect as well as restrict; coordinate as well 
as block; channel effort as well as limit it; permit universalism as well as provide sanctuary for 
the inept; maintain stability as well as retard change; permit diversity as well as restrict it. They 
constitute the organizational memory and the means for change.” (Perrow, 1979, p. 30) Rules 
can be characterized as neutral. They become either good or bad or both in regard of the certain 
groups of interests that have to adjust to the rules. Ukraine’s polytechnics that were later 
transformed into universities have defined strong cores according to which the educational 
process is built. These cores determine relations within the institution and present clear goals and 
tasks for the different academic and administrative units. 
Bureaucracies, such as Soviet polytechnics, are rational organizations. This does not 
mean that the decisions made in these organizations are the best and most efficient ones. For 
Allison, “Rationality refers to consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints.” 
(Allison, 1971, p. 30) Rationality here means that the administration works on matching 
resources with objectives and intentions with planned activities. Optimization is done by 
matching organization’s potential with tasks. Birnbaum says that the hierarchical nature of the 
universities that are rational organizations presumes that much of the process of determining 
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goals and deciding on how to achieve them will occur in the senior levels of administration and 
in particular gives a preeminent role to the president (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 113). Institutional 
rigidity in the rational organizations is significant and often presents an obstacle in changing 
formal rules or balances between the centers of authority within the hierarchy. But bureaucracies 
have their advantages as well. 
Weber (1952) explains the benefits of bureaucratic systems as follows: 
Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative 
organization… is… the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control 
over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the 
stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability…. However, much people may complain 
about the “evils” of bureaucracy, it would be sheer illusion to think for a moment that 
continuous administrative work can be carried out in any field except by means of 
officials working in offices…. The choice is only between bureaucracy and dilettantism 
in the field of administration. (Weber, 1952, p. 24) 
Weber does not address issues of external environment, power, and politics. His approach may 
seem incomplete for analyzing the situation where the bureaucratic organization is under impact 
of external forces, should adapt to the external environment, and tends to move toward political 
organization balancing powers and resolving the conflicts. 
Birnbaum says that the programs created by the universities-bureaucratic systems to 
enable them to repeat their success may create new problems, and the assurances of reliability 
that are made possible by the standard operating procedures, programs, and repertoires may 
prove to be the greatest barriers to organizational effectiveness, particularly during times of rapid 
changes. “Systems of accountability may lead to the “red tape” so that perfectly reasonable 
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actions and rules generated in one part of the organization are thwarted by perfectly reasonable 
actions and rules created in another.” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 118) The essence of contingency 
theory is that different forms of organization and administration prove to be the most effective 
under different conditions. 
Most of the polytechnics in Ukraine were created during the Soviet period of 
industrialization and the post-war reconstruction as a response to the phenomenal increase in 
demand for technical specialists. Polytechnics responded to this environmental and technical task 
by creating a mechanistic bureaucratic system that appeared to work and was generally accepted 
by the participants. By now the system needs to undertake substantial changes including possible 
reorientation in curriculum and specialties. Comprehensiveness leads polytechnics to organizing 
departments in the social sciences and the humanities. Dill (2000) notes that an economic 
perspective define and measure academic diversity in terms of program innovation in academic 
institutions, not only in teaching, research, and public service activities, but also in the processes 
of production and markets served. 
The problem of dualism in control exists in both collegiums and polytechnics, but it is 
solved differently based on the dominance of one of the forms of authority. In the polytechnics, 
the administrative authority dominates and is supreme to other forms of authority, including 
faculty committees and student organizations. This situation finds its reflection in decision-
making and institutional culture. New programs necessary to match the market demand are more 
likely to be implemented as a result of interaction of the president, deans, and department chairs 
rather than emerge as a result of faculty debate. 
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Even though all polytechnics are state HEIs, private HEIs also may be organized as 
tightly managed bureaucracies. Bureaucracies are not limited to public organizations but exist in 
large private organizations as well. Weber writes about bureaucratic hierarchies: 
The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered 
system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by 
the higher ones. Such a system offers the governed the possibility of appealing the 
decision of a lower office to its higher authority, in a definitely regulated manner. With 
the full development of the bureaucratic type, the office hierarchy is monocratically 
organized. The principle of hierarchical office authority is found in all bureaucratic 
structures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as well as in large party organizations and 
private enterprises. It does not matter for the character of bureaucracy whether its 
authority is called ‘private’ or ‘public’. (Weber, 1978, p. 650) 
 
University as a political system 
The notion of classical university that becomes popular over the last decade in Ukraine 
and in Russia is often associated with Medieval universities in Europe and emphasizes 
fundamental sciences in research, vide variety of disciplines in teaching, cultural role, 
international outreach, and participation in political life. It tends to become a trend for a 
university to be regarded as a classical if it was established before the Soviet period. Some of the 
polytechnics that were established in 19th and early 20th century and now offer a wide variety of 
disciplines, including social sciences, regard themselves as classical universities. 
According to the order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated September 5, 1996, 
classical university is a multidisciplinary higher education institution that prepares specialists in 
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a vide variety of fields, including natural sciences, humanities, technical sciences, and other 
disciplines. Classical universities conduct fundamental and applied research and cultural and 
educational activities. Overall, classical university unites in itself three socially significant 
institutions: science, education, and culture. It may sound paradoxically, but even the definition 
of classical university is given in the order of the Cabinet of Ministers. This points toward the 
dominant and de facto the only existing approach to understanding university governance. 
Classical university is considered by many as a status, along with such statuses, as national 
university, and hence is expected to be defined by a state body, i.e. executive branch of the 
government. 
Large state universities and polytechnics organized in the nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century can be seen as collegiums and bureaucracies that transform into political 
systems. Decision-making is one of the most interesting and complicated issues in the political 
systems. Cornford presents decision-making in political systems as follows: 
This most important branch of political activity is, of course, closely connected with 
Jobs…. When you and I have, each of us, a Job on hand, we shall proceed to go on the 
Square…. The proper course to pursue is to walk, between 2 and 4 p.m., up and down the 
King’s parade…. When we have succeeded in meeting accidentally, it is etiquette to talk 
about indifferent matters for ten minutes and then part. After walking five paces in the 
opposite directions you should call me back, and begin with the words “Oh, by the way, 
if you should happen….” The nature of your Job must then be vaguely indicated…. Then 
we shall part as before, and I shall call you back and introduce the subject of My Job, in 
the same formula. By observing this procedure we shall emphasize the fact that there is 
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no connection whatever between me supporting your Job and you supporting mine. 
(Cornford, 1964, p. 30) 
Such conversation is unrestricted in its content by any frames and is targeted to identify some 
touch points in the scholars’ interests. These common interests, if found, may lead to building a 
coalition. 
Cyert and March (1963) suggest that college as a political system should be considered as 
a supercoalition of subcoalitions with diverse interests, preferences, and goals. Bacharach and 
Lawler (1980) say that each of the subcoalitions is composed of interest groups that see some 
commonality in their goals and work together to achieve them. Birnbaum points to the difference 
between the collegiums and political systems and says that “If the collegium can be 
metaphorically described as a family, and the bureaucracy as a machine, then the political 
college or university can be seen as a shifting kaleidoscope of interest groups and coalitions. The 
patterns in the kaleidoscope are not static, and group membership, participation, and interests 
constantly change with emerging issues.” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 132) Coalitions may overlap and 
different interests and their representation may overlap too. Birnbaum notes that “In addition, 
individuals belong to more than one group, and they participate in any political processes, each 
of which involves different people. The existence of a large number of small cross-cutting 
disagreements provides checks and balances against major disruptions, so that the agitation of 
political processes can ironically lead to system stability.” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 136) 
Political games are played around the resources. Resource allocation in Ukraine’s higher 
education becomes the number one question in the process of entering the market. Budget 
redistribution and revenue regulations are the issues to be addressed not only by the central 
government, but by the different groups and coalitions. No doubt every group will pretend on the 
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rational position in these issues. Rational approaches to budgeting would suggest that the funding 
of all programs be reassessed each year, with the costs and benefits of each compared to each 
other, and decisions based on the optimization of stated objectives. Political process in budget 
formulation, on the other hand, simplifies calculations and usually leads to outcomes acceptable 
to a majority of stakeholders. 
Faculty, administration, departments, universities, and local authorities build coalitions. 
Coalitions are formed by individuals in order to achieve a level of power and influence that 
cannot be achieved by acting alone. Coalitions challenge formal authority or code of informal 
norms and rules. They are necessary for the process of negotiations. Before educators can decide 
whether to form a coalition, they weight the potential costs and benefits of doing so. 
Bargaining becomes a daily routine as it was with the orders in bureaucratic systems and 
collegial conversations in collegiums. People who participate in bargaining represent their 
groups and rarely themselves. Political systems are more vital, flexible, and adaptable to changes 
in compare with the collegiums and the bureaucratic systems. Bennett identifies three official 
power bases within the new higher education corporations: “i. The governing body, which is 
ultimately responsible for all the affairs of the institution; ii. The head of the institution who, 
subject to the overall powers of the governing body, is the chief executive and responsible for the 
management of the institution, and; iii. The academic board which, subject to the overall powers 
of the governing body and the head of the institution, is responsible for the academic activities of 
the institution.” (Bennett, 2002, p. 290) 
Universities as political systems, non-existent in the Soviet times, now develop in 
Ukraine. Both classical universities and polytechnics tend to become more political organizations 
but come to it from the different initial conditions. The commonality is that all of the 
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organizational types are to the certain extend organized anarchies. The characteristics of the 
organized anarchies are: problematic goals – a loose collection of changing ideas rather than a 
coherent structure; unclear technology – rather than leaders making conscious choices on 
operating procedures; fluid participation – the boundaries of the organization appear to be 
constantly changing due to the great variety in time and effort expended by individual 
participants. Conflicting wishes of university administration, faculty, parents, students, donors, 
alumni, legislators, and local communities make difficult to set, pursue, and achieve goals. 
Collegiums are more anarchical than bureaucracies, but all types of the institutions share 
some elements of collegiality, bureaucratic hierarchies, and political coalitions. Several levels of 
coordination may be found in the organized anarchies. The first one is professional coordination. 
Professional coordination is internal to the institution and represents coordination of academic 
and research activities of the faculty members. The second level of coordination is a political 
coordination. Political coordination exists on the state level as well as the local level. This 
coordination determines or influences the relations of the institution with the local and the central 
government. Political coordination may be seen as external to the university. The third level of 
coordination is market coordination. Along with political coordination, market coordination is 
external to the university. Market coordination comes into force with universities becoming more 
open and more market-responsive. Higher education in Ukraine is experiencing an increase in 
both political and market coordination. 
It is often difficult to predict political outcomes for all the parties-participants, including 
internal and external. In the case of Ukraine, internal participants will include university 
administration, groups of faculty members, representing different departments and colleges, 
research personnel, student organizations, and staff. External participants are identified so far as 
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the central government. The central government, however, is also not homogeneous. It consists 
of different political groups that lobby their interests and are involved in higher education policy. 
Such heterogeneity of both external forces represented by the central government and internal 
organizations within universities explains why political processes are most likely to be 
unpredictable in their results and impact on both university restructuring and government policy. 
Another external force is the open market, including labor market. This force is more 
homogeneous in its content and diverse in its directions and points of impact than the central 
government and university organizations combined. Market environment is very flexible and at 
the same time has a high degree of unpredictability of action and changing conditions, and so is 
its impact on the political decisions within the universities and the central government. Political 
decision adequately addressing the market demand today may become irrelevant tomorrow not 
because of its weaknesses or inherent contradictions but because of changes on the market. 
Choosing language of instruction is also a challenge. The state urges all state HEIs to 
conduct instruction in Ukrainian and encourages private HEIs to do the same. At the same time 
some of the state HEIs and numerous private HEIs, located in Eastern Ukraine, choose Russian 
as the primary language of instruction. This is explained not only by political motivations, but by 
the market reasons as well. Population in Eastern regions of the country presents demand for 
higher education services in Russian. The situation is such that different faculties in the same 
state university may use different languages of instruction. In the future, the language of 
instruction issue is likely to remain an object of negotiations between the universities and the 
state. Such negotiations may best be conducted if universities are to transform into political 
systems. 
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The need for university autonomy and self-governance is based not only on the search for 
higher effectiveness and efficiency of the higher education system, but also on the 
ineffectiveness of the state in governing the education sector. The government in Ukraine is in 
constant political debates and is ineffective in addressing the needs for the public sector 
restructuring. Moreover, the state may turn to be more violent and authoritarian as related to such 
institutions, as universities. Universities value freedom, while the state often prefers authoritarian 
rule and can use blackmail to make them loyal to the regime. The system of corruption and 
coercion may be applied to HEIs (Darden, 2002, Osipian, 2007, Riabchuk, 2007). 
University autonomy guarantees a high level of resistance to external pressures, primarily 
from the state, but it does not guarantee the prerogative of academic values and intellectual 
integrity. University autonomy is traditionally considered as independence from the state, but not 
from the church, or the public. Boards of Trust that govern many HEIs in the US have significant 
influence on the major issues even though they are not directly related to the academic life of the 
university. In this sense self-governance is not synonymous to autonomy. University self-
governance may be understood more as the governance for academic community by academic 
community. In this sense, the primary role in decision-making would be allotted to faculty and 
students, and more specifically, to the faculty senate and student council. 
The process of shaping the university autonomy is confronted by the process of 
amalgamation of the university and the state. University scholars go into power, accepting 
positions in the state and local administrations and other governmental institutions, such as the 
National Bank. Many teach part-time in Police academies and Taxation academies that are under 
the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior. Some even gain ranks in the police hierarchy. At the 
same time state officials associate themselves with universities. Many are listed as part time 
 39
instructors in state universities that are under their patronage. Others are enrolled in doctoral 
programs, seeking doctoral degrees rather than dedication to scholarship. Such state-university 
mergers are quite common in large cities in Ukraine. 
Part-time jobs of faculty members from different universities lead to inter-institutional 
diffusion. It indicates market-type behaviour on the level of individual faculty members. 
However, it remains unclear how faculties of economics in two different universities located in 
the same city can compete for students and for resources, if same faculty member teaches in both 
institutions. Inter-institutional diffusion does not contribute to university autonomy, because 
universities develop stronger ties among themselves. 
It is a misleading point that the Central government in Ukraine wants to see universities 
as well-managed autonomous enterprises able to follow the government’s guidelines and act 
timely and properly. Instead, the government may be very interested in building coalitions within 
the universities. The central government will build coalitions within the universities, form 
coalitions, and negotiate with the different groups using different tactics, including persuasion, 
monetary incentives, and direct administrative pressure. The government will seek the allies 
among the universities and within the universities. The government’s choice of the financial 
instrument in dealing with the universities may be a right hit as a universal tool, applicable to all 
the universities. Nevertheless, the central government should develop its relations with different 
types of the universities differently. If the government will identify political system of the 
university as a most convenient one to deal with, it should support the process of moving 
different types of the universities toward the political system of organization. Classical 
universities should be encouraged to give up part of their collegial tradition while the 
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bureaucratic polytechnics should weaken their institutional rigidity and hierarchical structure. 
These strategies will require flexibility from both the government and the universities. 
Incentives for faculty members, administrators, departments, and colleges should become 
an additional tool for the central government to influence universities in Ukraine. In distinction 
of the financing, the incentive tool should be used on the personal and departmental levels. 
Departmental funding and faculty salaries and promotions based on the open market orientation 
and development of entrepreneurial culture are the incentives to be used by the government. 
These incentives may work better if the government will be involved in the intra-university 
coalitions. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper challenges conventional understanding of university autonomy while 
considering the reform of higher education governance in Ukraine. The common view that 
university autonomy is necessary to develop high quality education and science is not taken for 
granted. The Soviet system was centralized and yet quite successful in developing mass higher 
education and strong science. Furthermore, weak university autonomy does not necessarily mean 
absence of self-governance. Instead, self-governance allows universities to pursue their primary 
goals of educating and creating new knowledge rather then being involved in managing 
investment funds. In the Soviet system, rectors were elected, while in the US, for instance, 
rectors are hired from the outside to mange universities. Finally, decentralization of higher 
education system does not automatically lead to higher degree of university autonomy. Indeed, 
the state steps out from its funding responsibilities, suggesting instead cost-sharing and revenue 
generation on the open market, but it also wants to fund and control leading universities and 
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hence, preserve its influence of the system. Issues of university autonomy, self-governance, and 
centralization and decentralization are still on the forefront in higher education. 
There is a commonly shared perception among the Ukraine’s educators that while the 
country’s higher education moves toward Europeanization, European national educational 
systems slowly transform into US-type models. In fact, the opposite is true. While Europeans 
systems are incredibly stubborn to any changes in governance and funding, and even the UK is 
very distant from introducing tuition and decentralized governance, higher education in former 
Soviet republics is in its large part for-tuition already, and university governance undergoes 
major changes. Universities in Ukraine are allowed to set their tuition that varies not only by 
university but by the major. Every year rising tuition reaches new heights (Ksenz, 2006). The 
Bologna declaration is imposed on university and aggressively implemented by the state while 
many universities oppose it. This is just another example of the centralized approach to the 
reform. Furthermore, the Bologna declaration means conformity in standards, not in the ways 
national systems are governed and funded. What one may observe in contemporary Ukraine is 
the beginning of de-facto privatization of higher education under the covers of Europeanization 
and the Bologna declaration. Private HEIs, of which even the most advanced ones cannot 
compete with state universities, attempt to blueprint their state counterparts in everything, 
including governance, instead of developing innovative structures and methods of education 
delivery. 
Changes in university governance, including autonomy, are needed not because the old 
system did not fulfill its tasks, but because of the changes in the external environment, including 
in the national economy and the social order. System of centralized governance is experiencing 
changes in its content, functions, mechanisms, and approaches, while remaining in its unity and 
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highly centralized structure. Bureaucratic and collegial organizations are difficult to adapt and 
respond to free market forces. Administrative and professional hierarchies, parallel in many 
dimensions, each of which employs different strategies, behaviour, structure of relations and 
decision-making, make process of changes nonlinear and diverse. 
Functions of university governance in Ukraine will change to respond to the external 
pressures from the central government and from the market. Uniformity of the central 
government’s reform policy may become inadequate to the plural forms in governance, 
collegiality and community values within the universities. Internal pressure within the 
universities, based on increase in political structure including coalition building and negotiations 
also makes changes in governance inevitable. Unclear goals and mechanisms of the reform, 
external and internal pressures, mismatch of interests, and conditions of organizational anarchy 
along with the growing political structure within the universities make prediction about further 
progress of the reform unrealistic. 
Ukrainian government transforms the centralized system into the number of independent 
free-floating and competing market enterprises. Also, government does not want to loose its 
control over the universities. The organizational forms of university governance as political 
systems may be most vital for the timely and adequate responses to the new external pressures 
from the central government and the market and internal pressures, including faculty and 
administration alliances. 
To oppose the government dictate, it would be logical for universities to build 
interuniversity coalitions. These coalitions in fact already exist, first of all, in form of the Council 
of Rectors, and, more importantly, in form of horizontal cooperation between the colleagues 
from the same departments within the different universities. However, market forces again play 
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their role here. If universities start to play by the market rules they become competitors on the 
market of higher education services. And colleagues in the academic dimension today may well 
become competitors in the market dimension tomorrow. This rivalry creates obstacle for 
interuniversity coalition building. Solution for this dualistic situation may come with political 
coalition building and lobbying interests in negotiations with the central government and 
economic rivalry on the open market. It is difficult to predict which one of the two forms of 
coalitions will prevail. 
Assurance of effective autonomy will lead to improvement of university positions in 
negotiations with the government and effective operating on the open market. Coordinated effort 
based on the professional, political, and market levels of coordination should be employed for 
the successful reform. Fundamental process that needs to take place is transformation from state 
universities to public universities. Clear division on non-profit and for-profit HEIs is also 
needed. Higher education in Ukraine is far from reaching its steady state. 
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